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Article: 
Philosophy and Sport resulted from a lecture series held in 2012 by the Royal Institute of 
Philosophy in Great Britain. As the anthology’s editor, Anthony O’Hear, explains, with the 2012 
London Olympics in the organization’s midst, ‘it seemed fitting to consider some of the many 
philosophical and ethical questions raised by sport’ (1). The quality of the analyses is thoughtful, 
though their novelty and significance to sport philosophy literature varies. The text includes 
thirteen essays by a total of fourteen authors. The authors cover a wide array of topics and speak 
most directly to trained philosophers. 
One of the best essays is the first. In ‘Ways of Watching Sport,’ Stephen Mumford argues that 
sports are designed to facilitate feats of athleticism that people find esthetically pleasing. When 
athletes ‘accept the lusory goal of a sport,’ Mumford writes, they ‘accept that the contest is to be 
staged on certain grounds, grounds that will require the exhibition of certain bodily esthetic 
qualities’ (9). In other words, although competitors may want to win, the requisite means to 
victory are intended to inspire beautiful performances. Many have assumed that since winning is 
the aim of most sports people, any beauty that emerges in the effort is incidental. Thus, 
‘partisans’ rather than ‘purists’ view sport ‘the right way’ (See Dixon 2001). In light of 
Mumford’s argument, however, this may not necessarily be the case. 
The following essay titled ‘The Martial Arts and Buddhist Philosophy,’ by Graham Priest, 
discusses how ‘[t]raining in the martial arts of the appropriate kind can itself be a way of 
treading the Buddhist Path’ (21). According to Priest, practicing martial arts involves intense 
concentration on ‘one’s body, the position of one’s limbs, the angle and speed of movements’ 
(26). This type of exercise promotes ‘one-pointedness’ – living in the present and emptying the 
mind of thought. Such experiences, Priest believes, lead to a loss of one’s sense of self and 
thereby ‘inner peace.’ Priest unnecessarily frames his argument against the strawman that martial 
arts and Buddhism contradict each other (because martial arts is about violence and Buddhism is 
about peace). Still, his explanation of how martial arts can work as a ‘moving meditation’ 
represents a holistic strategy that could be applied to many sporting endeavors. 
In the third essay, ‘Sport as a Moral Practice: An Aristotelian Approach,’ Michael W. Austin 
attempts to strengthen the common assumption that sport builds character. As he puts it, sport 
should be viewed as a ‘moral practice’ that cultivates ‘moral and intellectual virtue’ (29–30). 
Specifically, Austin contends that virtues such as prudence, courage, self-control, and justice can 
be learned through sport and later transferred to everyday life. Austin goes on to dismantle a 
number of counterarguments, showing this to be a realistic possibility. Ultimately, however, 
Austin concedes that his position is contingent on a series of ‘ifs.’ As he writes, 
if [people] take sport to be a moral practice, if they are fortunate enough to have moral 
exemplars to imitate, and if they are intentional about character development via their 
sport and transferring lessons and habits acquired to other realms of life, then their 
involvement in sport will be conducive to their flourishing.(43) 
If we treated sport as classroom for morality it can become a classroom for morality and that is a 
good thing. Fair enough. Yet, it seems less difficult to defend this abstraction than to apply it. 
Perhaps the more important question is: how should sport be organized so that it reaches its 
normative potential? 
In the fourth essay, ‘A Plea for Risk,’ Philip A. Ebert and Simon Robertson narrow their sights 
on the sport of mountaineering and assert that risk-taking in mountaineering can be justified ‘(in 
part) by and because of the risks it involves’ (45). Rather than viewing risks as something 
climbers put up with to get to other goods, Ebert and Robertson see risk as an integral part of the 
unique and positive experiences mountain climbing brings to life. ‘[R]isk is not just a means to 
these other goods,’ the authors write, ‘but a constitutive and ineliminable part of them’ (59). 
Ebert and Robertson mean that the risk creates a ‘kind of exhilaration and fulfillment … [that] is 
very different from that generated by … other activities’ (59). This thesis rings a note very 
similar (though not exactly the same) to John Russell’s (2005) essay ‘The Value of Dangerous 
Sport.’ 
The anthology’s editor, Anthony O’Hear, is the author of the fifth essay, titled ‘Not a Matter of 
Life and Death?’ The title is more provocative than indicative of its subject. O’Hear poses a 
basic question: why are sports valuable? His response is multifaceted and balanced. He admits 
sports are a product of pretense, but defends playing ‘make-believe’ on three grounds. The 
emotions we experience through sport are genuine. One’s actions have real impacts within the 
sports we play. And authentic virtues and vices are often exemplified. However, taking an 
existential turn, O’Hear does not stop there. He goes on to reason that sport is one of the better 
diversions people will inevitably embrace to avoid looking into ‘the abyss’ of life. For one, 
O’Hear contends, sport is honest since it ‘does not pretend to be more important than it is’ (76). 
Secondly, O’Hear claims sport is an exciting, relatively safe, and healthy ‘escape from the 
drudgery and drabness in which many are compelled to work and live’ (76). Though O’Hear still 
speculates that for the more serious minded sport will be a waste of time, he provides helpful 
reflections on why sport is so attractive to so many. 
The following essay, ‘Sport and Life,’ by Paul Snowden, takes on a similar topic, though it 
proves to be one of the more frustrating of the text. Snowden also aims to uncover what makes 
sport valuable, but does so by touching various subjects without regard for previous sport 
philosophy literature. He delves into the metaphysics of sport and competition, for instance, 
ignoring or unaware of decades of work on the topic (some of which is cited in this very 
anthology). In another example, Snowden identifies a distinction between ‘disinterested and 
interested spectators,’ meaning ‘spectators who do not care who wins and those who do’ (90). 
The discussion mirrors Nicholas Dixon’s (2001) work on purists and partisans, already 
prominently featured in Stephen Mumford’s essay. When Snowden comes to a conclusion 
opposed to Mumford’s, claiming that esthetic results are ‘accidental,’ since participants are 
primarily concerned with winning, one is left scratching one’s head, wondering why the 
presenters at the original lecture series did not respond to each other when it came time to submit 
their final drafts (93). 
The seventh essay is one of the most sophisticated. Timothy Chappell’s ‘Glory in Sport (and 
Elsewhere)’ is more about glory ‘elsewhere’ than in sport. Nevertheless, the essay gives sport 
philosophers interesting ideas to think about. Chappell calls for what he terms more ‘flexible 
modes’ of ethical reflection, hoping to get away from liberal duty-obligation paradigms, which 
he finds limiting. One of his solutions is the implementation of ‘glory’ as an ethical ideal. Glory, 
Chappell posits, is ‘what happens when a spectacularly excellent performance within a 
worthwhile form of activity meets the admiration that merits it’ (102). Chappell discusses 
various defenses to this thesis, but perhaps the most applicable and interesting question that 
arises for sport philosophers is this: should sportspeople actively promote their own recognition 
when they do something extremely well? Chappell proposal asks individuals not just to strive not 
for excellence, but to strive to obtain the recognition and appreciation from others. 
In the next essay, ‘Conceptual Problems with Performance Enhancing Technology in Sport,’ by 
Emily Ryall, ‘seeks to lay out some of the contradictions and conceptual problems inherent in 
elite athletic performance’ brought about by new ‘developments in technology’ (129). Namely, 
Ryall points to the ‘paradox’ that elite athletes aim to transcend previous human achievements, 
while remaining human. We attempt to balance the belief that sport is supposed to be ‘a test of 
the natural human capability,’ Ryall writes, ‘and at the same time an arena whereby we are able 
to surpass those limits’ (130). After considering three technologies that can enhance human 
capabilities – genetic engineering, ‘therapies’ for enhancement, and prosthetics – Ryall predicts 
that determining which technologies to allow will probably come down to social norms. 
Meanwhile, as technologies become more advanced, what is considered normal will likely be 
adjusted. Thus, it appears clear, in Ryall’s words, that ‘the contradictory logic behind elite 
athletic performance will [only] become more prominent and more problematic’ (143). Dig in 
your feet, sport philosophers, for the questions raised by performance enhancement are not going 
anywhere anytime soon. 
The ninth essay by Philip Barlett is titled ‘Is Mountaineering a Sport?’ but really ought to have 
been called ‘Should Mountaineering become an Olympic Sport?’ Mountain climbing’s status as 
a sport is never questioned, though Barlett argues that ‘there is very little ground on which 
mountaineering as currently understood sits easily within the Olympic movement’ (157). Barlett 
reaches this proposition by reasoning that the main purpose of climbing is to achieve a humble 
perspective of one place in the world, while simultaneously experiencing egocentric exhilaration 
due to personal accomplishment. Barlett posits this dynamic leads to contentment, satisfaction, 
and exhilaration. He claims this is unlike performances within Olympic sports, because such 
experiences cannot be quantified nor are they based on winning and losing. 
In the ensuing essay, ‘Rivarly in Cricket and Beyond: Healthy or Unhealthy?’ Michael Brearley 
delves into the merits of competition. Although he appears unaware of it, Bearley’s reflections 
lead him to an argument akin to Robert L. Simon’s (2010) theory that competition should be 
viewed as a ‘mutual quest for excellence’ (24–38). Indeed, as Brealey puts it, in sport ‘[o]ur 
opponents … become our collaborators in the search for excellence’ (173). Hence Brealey claims 
that competition becomes morally justifiable when approached as a cooperative enterprise. This 
means opponents view each other not just as adversaries, but also as fellow facilitators, agreeing 
to play the same game by the same rules and put forth their best efforts – making it possible for 
everyone involved to achieve higher levels of athletic skill. 
The subsequent essay, by David Papineau, titled ‘In the Zone,’ is one of the most polished and 
convincing of the book. Papineau attempts to understand how and why highly skilled and 
experienced athletes make inexplicably bad decisions during competition. To do so, he considers 
psychological theories of skilled behavior. The essay is too detailed to go into fully, but the 
ultimate result is an analysis about the simultaneous importance of concentration and 
unconscious processes. As Papineau explains it, when concentration is lost, certain unconscious 
processes that elite athletes rely on get disrupted. One expects Papineau’s essay could prove 
enlightening to competitors and coaches, as well as sport philosophers. 
Heather Reid composed the second to last essay, ‘Olympic Sacrifice: A Modern Look at an 
Ancient Tradition.’ Reid argues that ‘one of the oldest most venerable traditions in sport [is] 
individual sacrifice for the benefit of the larger community’ (197). She traces this ‘humanitarian’ 
tradition back to the ancient Greek Olympics and claims ‘it deserves to be revived [in] the 
modern world’ (197). Rather than commercialism, individual fame, and wealth, Olympic athletes 
should return to their historical and spiritual roots and ‘be seen foremost as community servants,’ 
competing on behalf of others and giving back whenever possible (199). This is a magnanimous 
(albeit idealistic) objective, though one that probably does not need us to recall a nostalgic 
version of Ancient Greece to become attractive. 
The final essay of the anthology is ‘Chess, Imagination, and Perceptual Understanding,’ by Paul 
Coates. This deep dive into the phenomenology of chess strategy examines the ‘connections 
between the way that we use our perceptual imagination in sports, and also in chess.’ Coates 
focuses on how people navigate ‘spatial possibilities’ through both ‘calculation’ and ‘natural 
instinct’ (211). As Coates elucidates, chess players must be able to understand how pieces move, 
grasp strategy and tactics, and image latent possibilities. Within this process, players must not 
only consciously assess possible moves accurately, they must rely on intuition to determine 
which maneuvers to consider in the first place. Coates goes beyond just sport and applies this 
analysis to everyday life, asserting that ‘chess provides a model of our perceptual engagement 
with physical reality’ (235). 
Overall Philosophy and Sport touches upon a variety of topics of interest to sport philosophers. 
Perhaps the biggest complaint to be levied is that on occasion authors overlooked relevant work 
from the sport philosophy literature. This lack of communication between scholars is troubling. 
Given the efforts put forth in this book, one wonders if journals such as the Journal of 
Philosophy of Sport ought to do more to publicize their content. 
Adam Berg 
Kinesiology, Penn State University, 274 Recreation Building, University Park, PA 16802, United 
States 
apb5152@psu.edu 
© 2016 Adam Berg 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2016.1180529 
References 
1. Dixon, N. 2001. “The Ethics of Supporting Sports Teams.” Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 18: 149–158.10.1111/japp.2001.18.issue-2 
2. Russell, J. S. 2005. “The Value of Dangerous Sport.” Journal of the Philosophy of 
Sport 32 (1): 1–19.10.1080/00948705.2005.9714667 
3. Simon, R. L. 2010. “Competition in Athletics: Is it Morally Defensible?” In Fair Play. 
The Ethics of Sport,3rd ed. 17–38. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
